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Position For Contracts Governed by 
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William P. Johnson*
Abstract: Under domestic U.S. sales law, usage of trade is relevant in 
ascertaining the meaning of an agreement, and it can be used to supplement, 
qualify, or explain an agreement.  However, usage of trade may not be used 
under domestic U.S. sales law to contradict a written agreement.  Moreover, any 
course of performance or course of dealing between the parties will prevail over 
inconsistent usage of trade.  The United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, or CISG, similarly provides for consideration of 
usage to establish the terms of the agreement between the parties, as well as to 
determine party intent.  When applying the CISG, U.S. courts have assumed that 
the same hierarchy they are accustomed to under domestic U.S. sales law that 
automatically relegates usage to a subsidiary role must exist under the CISG as 
well.  But the CISG does not establish a hierarchy that requires usage to defer 
automatically to party conduct or to established party practice.  Usage can be 
important for determining the terms of the agreement between the parties, 
especially when a commercial arrangement is consummated without a robust 
written agreement.  Therefore, proper analysis of the role of usage is essential.  
This Article analyzes this issue and proposes a better understanding of the role 
of usage in the sale of goods contracts governed by the CISG. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine an ornate boardroom at the top of an office tower overlooking 
a fast-paced, exciting, non-U.S. city, where a complex international 
business deal is negotiated and eventually finalized by sophisticated 
businesspersons and their counselors.  The members of the negotiation 
teams speak different languages and engage in different business practices.  
They likely have different negotiation styles and values.  But each is 
focused on getting the deal done. 
Now imagine the tools used in connection with this negotiation 
involving parties from different parts of the world:  smartphones, 
notebooks, leather briefcases, expensive business attire. 
And what of their eventual contract?  Perhaps an impressive image 
comes to mind of a lengthy, complicated, carefully drafted agreement, 
written in two languages, with multiple original copies, all signed by the 
parties and their respective witnesses.  The agreement certainly has 
numerous exhibits attached to it.  These exhibits were expressly 
incorporated into the agreement by reference, and they identify in detail the 
specific responsibilities of the parties, the scope of their arrangement, an 
agreed-upon means of measuring satisfactory performance, forms of 
ancillary agreements, and the allocation of a variety of anticipated risks. 
These archetypal images, portrayed in film and literature, reflect one 
face of the international business transaction experience, and the impressive 
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written agreement is one iteration of the many kinds of contracts that are 
made by parties to business transactions.  At times, contracting parties take 
the time to put in place a comprehensive written agreement that sets forth 
the mutually agreed-upon terms of their business deal.  More often than one 
might imagine, however, commercial arrangements simply do not result in 
an executed written agreement that reflects the agreed-upon terms and 
allocation of risk and responsibility between the parties.1  The fast pace of 
the world of commerce, the potential strain on the business relationship 
caused by an intense negotiation, the high cost of a business lawyer’s time, 
the opportunity cost of the businessperson’s time, and the belief that 
nothing bad will happen can all contribute to a simple failure to establish in 
writing the agreed-upon terms of the deal. 
Even though the parties have not adopted a formal writing entitled 
“CONTRACT” or “AGREEMENT,” once the parties reach a mutual 
understanding regarding their business arrangement and commence 
performance, they surely have a contract nevertheless, even though there is 
no written agreement that embodies the agreed-upon terms of that contract.  
This is true under different legal traditions.2  To the extent that the parties 
have not expressly reached agreement, the law will fill the gaps with default 
contract terms, and those default terms are just as binding as if they were 
expressly written into the agreement by the parties themselves. 
Expecting good things to happen, the parties may be oblivious to the 
nature of the terms that the law will recognize as binding terms of their 
unwritten contract.  If the arrangement proceeds as planned, no unexpected 
contingencies materialize, and no losses occur, then the parties are likely to 
be happy and the terms of the contract between the parties are unlikely to 
matter. 
But sometimes things go wrong.  Sometimes serious contingencies 
materialize that cause at least one of the parties to be unable to perform, to 
regret the bargain struck, or to suffer significant unanticipated losses.  
Similarly, sometimes there are serious misunderstandings between the 
parties regarding their actual intent for the contractual allocation of risk and 
responsibility, whether due to cultural differences, language barriers, haste 
in the consummation of the transaction, or other causes.  Those 
contingencies and misunderstandings can cause the relationship to 
deteriorate in such a way that the parties no longer have any expectation 
that good things will happen.  When those kinds of situations arise, disputes 
often follow, and the terms of the contract can matter a great deal. 
In such a case, the express terms of the contract may be reflected in a 
1 For some discussion of the actual practices of parties to commercial contracts with 
respect to entering into written agreements, see generally DANIEL KEATING, SALES: A
SYSTEMS APPROACH 95–97 (5th ed. 2011). 
2 See, e.g., THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW arts. 2.101 & 2.102 (2002); 
U.C.C. §§ 2-204(1), 2-207(3) (2011); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 (1981). 
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variety of documents or sources, including communications between the 
parties (written, electronic, or even oral), order documents, shipping 
documents, standard terms and conditions, and the like.  But the parties’ 
bargain may also be reflected in other, less obvious sources, such as their 
conduct under the contract at issue,3 their conduct in the past,4 and the 
practices of other actors in the applicable industry or trade.5  Any or all of 
these sources could potentially be used to determine the terms of the 
contract between the parties as well, within the United States and in other 
jurisdictions. 
But what if these disparate sources conflict?  What if the parties’ 
conduct in the past is at odds with the parties’ conduct under this contract?  
What if the parties are behaving under this contract in a way that is 
inconsistent with the way similarly situated parties operating in the same 
industry behave under like contracts? 
Under U.S. domestic law applicable to commercial transactions, 
finding the answers to these questions is generally quite simple.  The 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) establishes a clear hierarchy when 
considering various sources to determine the terms of a contract governed 
by the UCC.6 Under the UCC, the parties’ behavior under the contract at 
issue will prevail over the parties’ behavior in the past.7 The parties’ own 
3 See, e.g., THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW art. 1.105 (2002); U.C.C. § 1-
303(a), (d) (2011). 
4 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-303(b), (d) (2011); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223 
(1981). 
5 See, e.g., THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW art. 1.105 (2002); U.C.C. § 1-
303(c)–(d) (2011); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 221 (1981). 
6 See U.C.C. § 1-303(e) (2011).  The UCC has been widely adopted into the law of the 
states of the United States.  Article 2 of the UCC generally applies to all transactions in 
goods.  See id. § 2-102 (2011).  Article 2 of the UCC defines “goods:”
“Goods” means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are 
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money 
in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in 
action.  “Goods” also includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops and 
other identified things attached to realty as described in the section on goods to be 
severed from realty (Section 2-107). 
Id. § 2-105(1).  Thus, the scope of Article 2 of the UCC is quite broad.  Moreover, Article 2 
of the UCC has been adopted by every state throughout the United States, other than the 
State of Louisiana, making Article 2 the primary domestic sales law in the United States.  
See Uniform Commercial Code Locator, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL—LEGAL 
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/ucc.html#a2 (last visited Dec. 
12, 2011).  See also UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, UCC ARTICLE 2, SALES AND ARTICLE 2A,
LEASES (2003), SUMMARY, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=UCC% 
20Article%202,Sales%20and%20Article%202A,%20Leases%20%282003%29 (last visited 
Dec. 12, 2011). 
7 Specifically, course of performance prevails over course of dealing.  U.C.C. § 1-303(e) 
(2011). 
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behavior in the past will prevail over the conduct of other parties in the 
industry.8  Express terms will prevail over all of the foregoing.9
But what if the goods cross an international border?  What if the 
transaction involves vegetables entering Texas from Mexico?  Or 
automotive parts made in China that enter the United States by means of a 
Great Lakes port?  Or costly machinery that is sold into Canada by a North 
Dakota manufacturer?  Should the analysis by a U.S. court be any different? 
Some U.S. courts have apparently assumed that the rules of the game 
are the same.10  That assumption is false.  The analysis is different because 
the UCC will not govern the international sale of goods in the typical case.11
Instead, for many international sales of commercial goods, the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) will govern the transaction.12  The hierarchy that is present in the 
UCC is absent in the CISG; and analysis under the CISG, reflecting not 
only the common law but also the intentional influence of different legal, 
economic, and social systems,13 is different from analysis under the UCC, 
8 Specifically, course of dealing prevails over usage of trade.  Id.
9 Id.; see also id. § 2-202. 
10 See, e.g., Treibacher Industrie, A.G. v. Allegheny Techs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1235, 1238–
39 (11th Cir. 2006); Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochemicals., Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 426, 433 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).  In each case, the court assumed an automatic hierarchy that would cause 
party conduct to prevail over usage as an extrinsic source of contract terms, as discussed in 
Parts I.A and V.A, infra. 
11 While Article 2 of the UCC generally governs transactions in goods, see U.C.C. § 2-
102 (2011), the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
or CISG, infra note 12, will preempt the UCC when the CISG is applicable because the 
CISG, as a treaty made under the authority of the United States, is part of the supreme law of 
the land.  For additional analysis by the author of preemption of the UCC by the CISG, see 
William P. Johnson, Understanding Exclusion of the CISG: A New Paradigm of Determining 
Party Intent, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 213, 223–26 (2011). 
12 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, opened 
for signature Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. No. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1988) [hereinafter CISG].  Subject to certain exclusions, the CISG governs 
contracts for the sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different 
countries when the countries are “Contracting States” (or parties to the CISG).  Id. art. 
1(1)(a).  In the typical cross-border sale of goods transaction, when the parties know the 
goods are crossing an international border, the CISG will usually govern the transaction, if 
the parties’ places of business that are most directly involved with the transaction are in 
countries that have ratified the CISG.  See id. arts. 1(2), 10(a).  Because there are currently 
78 parties to the CISG, including most of the major trading partners of the United States, the 
CISG is potentially relevant for a very large volume of international trade.  See Dep’t of 
State Pub. Notice 1004, 52 Fed. Reg. 6262 (Mar. 2. 1987); see also U. N. Treaty Collection, 
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, ch. X 10: International Trade and 
Development, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
Status (last updated Apr. 18, 2009), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/ 
MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20X/X-10.en.pdf [hereinafter CISG Status]. 
13 See CISG, supra note 12, pmbl.; see also CISG, supra note 12, at explanatory note by 
the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the UN Convention on Contracts for the Int’l Sale of Goods, 
¶ 3 [hereinafter CISG Explanatory Note].  The CISG Explanatory Note was prepared by the 
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leading to different questions, different answers, and different outcomes.  
Yet, the simplicity and familiarity of the UCC and its hierarchical approach 
to extrinsic sources of contract terms is a tempting siren’s call that U.S. 
courts have been unable to resist. 
In addition to finding a non-existent hierarchy in the CISG, U.S. courts 
have improperly imported UCC concepts of “course of dealing” and 
“course of performance” into their analysis of contracts governed by the 
CISG, even though course of performance and course of dealing are terms 
that do not appear in the CISG.  Focusing on UCC concepts of course of 
performance and course of dealing has caused U.S. courts to fail to take 
note of and to apply carefully the CISG provisions that pertain to the CISG 
concept, “practices which [the parties] have established between 
themselves . . . .”14
As a consequence of UCC bias, U.S. courts have utterly failed to 
recognize the different approach required by the CISG, leaving 
businesspersons engaging in international sales transactions with 
unnecessary and undesirable uncertainty regarding the terms of their sales 
contracts.  That uncertainty increases transaction costs and undermines 
efficiency.  U.S. courts’ incorrect analysis and misapplication of the CISG 
also hinder realization of the goals of the CISG to promote uniformity in its 
application and to contribute to the development of international trade.15
A different approach is needed.  U.S. courts must engage in more 
careful analysis and application of the CISG and discontinue improperly 
relegating “usage” to a subsidiary position of deference not contemplated or 
supported by the CISG.  Similarly, U.S. courts must not prematurely import 
UCC concepts into their analysis of the CISG or fail to take note of CISG 
concepts with which the U.S. court might not be familiar. 
This Article identifies some of the multi-faceted problems that have 
arisen as a result of inaccurate perception by U.S. courts of the role usage is 
to play in a court’s analysis of contracts governed by the CISG.  The 
relationship between usage and practices the parties have established 
between themselves has been one significant problem in this area.  This 
Article seeks to bring understanding to that relationship.  This Article also 
identifies the role that usage is actually to play under the CISG—a role that 
is different from and more prominent than the role prescribed by the UCC.  
Finally, this Article identifies an analytical framework that courts can use to 
apply properly Article 9 of the CISG. 
UNCITRAL Secretariat for informational purposes and is not an official commentary to the 
CISG.  See id.
14 Id. art. 9(1); see also id. arts. 8(3) & 18(3). 
15 See id. pmbl. & art. 7(1). 
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 I.  IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: MISAPPLICATION OF ARTICLE 9 
OF THE CISG 
When the CISG is applicable to a contract for the sale of goods, usage 
can become a binding term of the contract pursuant to Article 9 of the 
CISG,16 which U.S. courts have recognized.  In fact, notwithstanding the 
occasional lingering claim by U.S. courts that there is a dearth of U.S. case 
law analyzing or applying the CISG, which is no longer true,17 several U.S. 
courts have applied Article 9 of the CISG.18  Some have even considered 
the role of usage in analysis of issues under the CISG.19  Unfortunately, 
much of that analysis has been faulty. 
The CISG bears some similarities to Article 2 of the UCC,20 and for 
16 See id. art. 9.  Article 9 provides as follows: 
(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any 
practices which they have established between themselves. 
(2) The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made 
applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or 
ought to have known and which in international trade is widely known to, and 
regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular 
trade concerned. 
Id.
17 As recently as early 2011, a federal district court in New York asserted that “caselaw 
interpreting the CISG is relatively sparse . . . .”  Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochemicals., 
Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  That simply is no longer true, even with 
respect to U.S. case law; and it has not been true with respect to case law of non-U.S. courts 
for years.  See Lisa Spagnolo, A Glimpse Through the Kaleidoscope: Choices of Law and the 
CISG (Kaleidoscope Part I), 13 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 135, 153 & n.81 (2009) 
(stating that scarcity of CISG case law is a misconception and pointing out that there were at 
that time already more than 2,000 CISG cases on the Pace University CISG website). 
18 See, e.g., Treibacher Industrie, A.G. v. Allegheny Techs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1235, 1238–
39 (11th Cir. 2006); BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 
333, 337–38 (5th Cir. 2003), as amended on denial of reh’g; Riccitelli v. Elemar New 
England Marble & Granite, LLC, No. 3:08CV01783 (DJS), 2010 WL 3767111, at *5–6 (D. 
Conn. Sept. 14, 2010); ECEM European Chem. Mktg. B.V. v. Purolite Co., Civil Action No. 
05-3078, 2010 WL 419444, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010); Berry v. Ken M. Spooner 
Farms, Inc., No. C05-5538FDB, 2006 WL 1009299 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2006), rev’d 254 
Fed. Appx. 646 (9th Cir. 2007); China N. Chem. Indus. Corp. v. Beston Chem. Corp., No. 
Civ.A. H-04-0912, 2006 WL 295395, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2006); St. Paul Guardian Ins. 
Co. v. Neuromed Med. Sys. & Support, GmbH, No. 00 CIV. 9344(SHS), 2002 WL 465312, 
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002); Shuttle Packaging Sys., L.L.C. v. Tsonakis, No. 1:01-CV-
691, 2001 WL 34046276, at *1–2 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2001); Claudia v. Olivieri Footwear 
Ltd., No. 96 Civ. 8052(HB)(THK), 1998 WL 164824, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998). 
19 See, e.g., Treibacher Industrie, A.G., 464 F.3d at 1237–39; BP Oil Int’l, Ltd., 332 F.3d 
at 337–38; China N. Chem. Indus. Corp., 2006 WL 295395 at *6; St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 
2002 WL 465312 at *3–4. 
20 The supposed similarities between the UCC and the CISG have been noted by 
numerous U.S. courts and some commentators.  See, e.g., Schmitz-Werke GmbH & Co. v. 
Rockland Indus., Inc., 37 F. Appx. 687, 691 (4th Cir. 2002); Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex 
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that reason, there is a temptation for U.S. courts simply to engage in UCC-
like analysis of CISG provisions that are seemingly analogous to provisions 
of Article 2 of the UCC.  In fact, U.S. courts have routinely asserted that 
UCC analysis of analogous CISG provisions is appropriate.21
Unfortunately, this has even been supported by some commentators.22  But 
engaging in such analysis is not appropriate; it can readily lead to 
misapplication of CISG provisions and to wrongly decided outcomes.23  It 
also undermines the stated purpose of the CISG to promote uniform rules 
governing contracts for the international sale of goods.  As Professor 
Franco Ferrari has cogently argued, it is both “impermissible and dangerous 
to assert that the concepts of the CISG and the UCC are analogous.”24  U.S. 
courts’ misapplication of Article 9 provides one example of the 
consequences of failing to recognize that the CISG is not the same as the 
UCC. 
A. Treibacher Industrie, A.G. v. Allegheny Technologies, Inc. and the 
Eleventh Circuit’s Improper Imposition of Automatic Hierarchy
One problem that has flowed from the bias for UCC-style analysis of 
CISG provisions perceived to be analogous to the UCC is the subsidiary 
role to which usage has improperly been relegated as one source for 
determining the terms of the parties’ agreement.  One notable example of 
this is Treibacher Industrie, A.G. v. Allegheny Technologies, Inc. and the 
Eleventh Circuit’s unsupported claim that “under the CISG, the meaning 
the parties ascribe to a contractual term in their course of dealings 
establishes the meaning of that term in the face of a conflicting customary 
usage of the term.”25  That statement reflects a confused view of the 
applicable provisions of the CISG that is inaccurate in at least two ways: its 
Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995); Hanwha Corp., 760 F. Supp. 2d at 430; Raw 
Materials, Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GmbH & Co., No. 03 C 1154, 2004 WL 1535839, at 
*3–4 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 2004); JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG 45 n.250 (3d 
ed. 2008); see also Letter of Submittal from George P. Schultz, U.S. Sec’y of State, to 
Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of Am. (Aug. 30, 1983), in S. TREATY DOC. 
No. 98-9, at vi (1983) (“It will be noted that the Convention embodies the substance of many 
of the important provisions of the UCC and is generally consistent with its approach and 
outlook.”).
21 See, e.g., Schmitz-Werke GmbH, 37 F. App’x at 691; Delchi Carrier SpA, 71 F.3d at 
1028; Hanwha Corp., 760 F. Supp. 2d at 430; Raw Materials,  2004 WL 1535839, at *3–4. 
22 See, e.g., LOOKOFSKY, supra note 20, at 45 n.250. 
23 See Ronald A. Brand & Harry M. Flechtner, Arbitration and Contract Formation in 
International Trade: First Interpretations of the U.N. Sales Convention, 12 J.L. & COM. 239, 
241 (1993) (“[A]lthough the Convention contains many terms and concepts that appear 
similar to ones in domestic U.S. law, the apparent similarity can be misleading.  It is easy to 
distort the unfamiliar by forcing it into a pattern we already know.”).
24 Franco Ferrari, The Relationship Between the UCC and the CISG and the Construction 
of Uniform Law, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1996). 
25 Treibacher Industrie, A.G. v. Allegheny Techs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1235, 1240 (11th Cir. 
2006). 
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use of the term “course of dealing” and its assumption that there is an 
automatic hierarchy. 
The dispute in Treibacher Industrie arose out of two written 
agreements entered into by Treibacher Industrie, A.G. (Treibacher), an 
Austrian company and the seller in the transaction, and TDY Industries, 
Inc. (TDY), a U.S. company and the buyer, for the sale of specified 
quantities of tantalum carbide, a hard metal powder, which was to be 
delivered “to consignment.”26  Treibacher began to supply the product, but 
after TDY received some of the product, TDY refused to accept additional 
deliveries and took the position that it was not obligated to do so.27  After 
selling the remaining quantities of product to third parties at a loss, 
Treibacher filed suit against TDY, asserting six different claims, including 
breach of contract under the CISG and misrepresentation.28  Following a 
motion for summary judgment that eliminated Treibacher’s other claims, 
Treibacher’s remaining claims for breach of contract and misrepresentation 
were tried to the bench sitting without a jury.29
At its heart, the dispute concerned whether TDY was obligated by 
contract to take and pay for the entire quantity of product specified in the 
written agreements.30  The genesis of the dispute was use by the parties in 
their written agreements of the term “consignment” and the disagreement 
between the parties regarding the meaning and effect of that term.31 TDY’s 
position was that there was no obligation to take and pay for specified 
quantities of product unless and until TDY took the product out of 
consignment and used it.32  TDY introduced evidence of usage in the 
applicable trade that supported that understanding of the term 
consignment.33  Treibacher took the position that, notwithstanding use of 
the term consignment in their written agreements, the parties had an 
understanding that TDY was bound to take and pay for one hundred percent 
of the quantity of product specified in the written agreements.34  Treibacher 
also offered evidence of the parties’ conduct to support its position.35
Accepting Treibacher’s position on the matter, the trial court awarded 
Treibacher damages, and TDY appealed.36
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment.37
26 Id. at 1236, 1236 n.1. 
27 Id. at 1236. 
28 Id. at 1236, 1236 n.3. 
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1236–37. 
31 Treibacher Industrie, A.G., 464 F.3dat 1236–37. 
32 Id. at 1237. 
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Treibacher Industrie, A.G., 464 F.3d.at 1237. 
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In reaching its holding, the Eleventh Circuit stated in its opinion that the 
trial court had ruled that under the CISG “evidence of the parties’ 
interpretation of the term [consignment] in their course of dealings trumped 
evidence of the term’s customary usage in the industry . . . .”38  And the 
Eleventh Circuit continued by asserting that “the district court did not make 
a finding regarding the customary usage of the term because it found that 
the parties had established a meaning for the term in their course of 
dealings, thus rendering customary usage irrelevant.”39
The Eleventh Circuit, in its de novo review of application of the CISG, 
should have looked carefully at the CISG and corrected what would have 
amounted to a misstatement of law.  But a careful review of the trial court’s 
judgment reveals that the trial court did not conclude that an apparent 
course of dealing automatically trumps a conflicting usage or that course of 
dealing would render usage irrelevant.40  Rather, the trial court focused on 
determining the parties’ actual intent regarding the meaning of the term 
consignment, which it did by carefully reviewing the evidence that was 
available to it.41  The trial court ultimately found that the parties shared an 
intent that TDY was obligated to purchase the quantities specified in the 
written agreements.42
Indeed, although it referred repeatedly to course of dealing in its 
Memorandum of Decision,43 the trial court otherwise essentially engaged in 
the kind of analysis that the CISG requires.  The trial court looked carefully 
at the contract documents and order documents actually used by the parties, 
and it considered the parties’ communications,44 their subsequent conduct,45
and the credibility of witnesses and their testimony.46
Based on its review of all of the circumstances of the case, described in 
some detail in seventeen pages of its Memorandum of Decision, the trial 
court found as a matter of fact that the parties intended to enter into a 
contract of sale of goods, “with transfer of title and payment deferred until 
withdrawal [of the goods from consignment], such withdrawal to occur 
within a (mutually agreed) reasonable time.”47
38 Id. (emphasis added).  The Eleventh Circuit also stated, correctly, that the court below 
“found that Treibacher and TDY, in their course of dealings, understood the term to mean 
‘that a sale had occurred, but that invoices would be delayed until the materials were 
withdrawn.’”  Id.
39 Id. at 1237 n.4 (emphasis added). 
40 See Memorandum of Decision, Treibacher Industrie, A.G. v. TDY Indus., Inc., Case 
No.: CV-01-HS-2872-NE (N.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 2005). 
41 See id. at 5–14. 
42 See id. at 5–6, & 21. 
43 See id. at 1, 5, 9, & 18–20. 
44 See id. at 9–10, & 12–14. 
45 See id. at 5–6 & 10. 
46 See id. at 2 n.2. 
47 Id. at 21. 
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The trial court did not devote an inordinate amount of time to the 
consideration of arguably applicable trade usages.  That does not mean that 
the trial court concluded that usage was automatically irrelevant.  Indeed, 
notwithstanding the Eleventh Circuit’s statements, the trial court clearly did 
consider the evidence pertaining to usage, and it ultimately found the 
evidence to be inconsistent and unhelpful in respect of determining party 
intent.  In fact, the trial court specifically acknowledged that there was 
evidence that, within the U.S. hard metals market, the trade usage of the 
term “consignment” meant that there was no obligation to pay for materials 
unless and until they were withdrawn from consignment.  The court 
therefore considered evidence of usage without characterizing that evidence 
as irrelevant.48 The trial court noted that it “heard conflicting testimony 
regarding the meaning of the term [consignment] in the industry.”49
Ultimately, the trial court found, based on the evidence available to it, 
including the parties’ practices and their conduct, that the parties actually 
intended the term “consignment” to include an obligation, binding on TDY, 
to take and pay for all materials held by it on consignment.50  That finding 
is a sensible finding that is supported by the record. 
The trial court made its finding without making any express 
conclusion regarding any automatic hierarchical relationship between usage 
and course of dealing.  Such a conclusion was unnecessary for the 
disposition of the case.  Why the Eleventh Circuit decided that it was 
necessary to add its broad and inaccurate statement is unclear, and it is 
unfortunate that it occurred. 
One possible explanation for the Eleventh Circuit’s 
mischaracterization of the record is its focus on an argument made by TDY 
in support of its position that its proposed definition of “consignment” 
derived from usage ought to control.  Specifically, TDY argued that, “under 
the CISG, a contract term should be construed according to its customary 
usage in the industry unless the parties have expressly agreed to another 
usage.”51  The Eleventh Circuit appropriately rejected that desperate attempt 
to distort the language of the CISG, but it went too far, concluding that “the 
parties’ usage of a term in their course of dealings controls that term’s 
meaning in the face of a conflicting customary usage of the term.”52
B.  The Influence of the UCC 
Had the court been applying the UCC, its statement would have been 
generally accurate, though perhaps oversimplified.  Under the UCC, course 
48 Id. at 19. 
49 Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
50 See id. at 5–6, 21. 
51 Treibacher Industrie, A.G. v. Allegheny Techs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1235, 1237 (11th Cir. 
2006). 
52 Id. at 1239. 
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of performance,53 course of dealing,54 and usage of trade,55 as those terms 
are defined in Section 1-303 of the UCC, can become part of the agreement 
between the parties without express incorporation by the parties.56  When 
applicable usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance 
seem to conflict, the UCC establishes a hierarchy.  A court is first to 
construe those extrinsic sources of contract terms to be consistent with each 
other whenever the court can reasonably do so.57  If the conflict cannot be 
reconciled, then course of dealing prevails over usage of trade, and course 
of performance prevails over both.58  The CISG, by contrast, does not create 
a hierarchical relationship between usage and course of performance or 
course of dealing.  In fact, the CISG does not even use the term course of 
dealing or the term course of performance.  U.S. courts have not accounted 
for this when conducting analysis under the CISG of behavior that appears 
to establish a course of dealing, as that term is understood under the UCC. 
Instead of course of dealing or course of performance, the CISG refers 
to “practices which [the parties] have established between themselves,”59
which is, of course, a different term that has its meaning derived not from 
the UCC but from the CISG.  Such party practice becomes a term of the 
parties’ agreement, insofar as “[t]he parties are bound” thereby by virtue of 
establishing the practice between themselves.60  The CISG also includes 
“subsequent conduct of the parties” as one of the relevant circumstances 
courts are directed to consider when determining party intent.61  Thus, under 
both the CISG and the UCC, the behavior of the parties can be indicative of 
their shared intent to be bound.  How that behavior is to be analyzed and 
ultimately incorporated into the parties’ agreement is certainly not the same 
53 The UCC defines “course of performance” to mean:
[A] sequence of conduct between the parties to a particular transaction that exists 
if: (1) the agreement of the parties with respect to the transaction involves repeated 
occasions for performance by a party; and (2) the other party, with knowledge of 
the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it, accepts the 
performance or acquiesces in it without objection. 
U.C.C. § 1-303(a) (2011). 
54 Course of dealing is defined as “a sequence of conduct concerning previous 
transactions between the parties to a particular transaction that is fairly to be regarded as 
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other 
conduct.”  Id. § 1-303(b). 
55 Usage of trade is defined in the UCC as “any practice or method of dealing having 
such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it 
will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.”  Id. § 1-303(c). 
56 See U.C.C. § 1-303(d) (2011). 
57 Id. § 1-303(e). 
58 Id.
59 CISG, supra note 12, art. 9(1). 
60 Id.
61 Id. art. 8(3). 
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under the CISG and the UCC.  While the CISG concepts are similar in 
some respects and will at times have the same or similar effects, the 
concepts are not equivalent and the appropriate methods of analysis are 
distinct.  In any event, the CISG does not establish a hierarchy that causes 
conduct to prevail automatically over usage or that renders usage irrelevant.  
The Eleventh Circuit’s assertion to the contrary, claiming an automatic 
hierarchy, is not supported by the text of the CISG. 
It is really no surprise that some U.S. courts are influenced by their 
understanding of the UCC and the common law when applying provisions 
of the CISG.  This “homeward trend” was identified early in the history of 
the CISG.62  And under some limited circumstances, when a question 
governed by the CISG is not expressly settled by the CISG, it is eventually 
possible to answer the question “in conformity with the law applicable by 
virtue of the rules of private international law.”63  In the limited 
circumstances when that occurs, any court adjudicating a conflict before it 
that is governed by the CISG will have its own rules of private international 
law, or conflicts of laws, and should apply those rules to determine the 
substantive body of law that would govern the dispute pursuant to those 
rules.  In the United States, that will often be the UCC, unless the parties 
have effectively selected the laws of a jurisdiction outside the United 
States.64  But courts should not leap to domestic principles to answer 
questions that are answerable by reference to the text of the CISG. 
Even when the question is not expressly settled by the text of the 
CISG, the question must be answered, when possible, “in conformity with 
62 See generally JOHN HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR 
INT’L SALES (Kluwer Int’l 1989); Harry Flechtner, Article 79 of the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) as Rorschach Test: The 
Homeward Trend and Exemption for Delivering Non-Conforming Goods, 19 PACE INT’L L.
REV. 29, 30–31 (2007). 
63 CISG, supra note 12, art. 7(2). 
64 In the United States, under the UCC, the parties are free to choose the state or country 
whose laws will govern their transaction, as long as the transaction bears a reasonable 
relation to the state or country selected: “Except as otherwise provided in this section, when 
a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the 
parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern 
their rights and duties.”  U.C.C. § 1-301(a) (2011).  The official comments to Section 1-301 
of the UCC confirm that the parties to a multi-state transaction or a transaction involving 
foreign trade have the right to choose their own law, but that the right to choose their own 
law “is limited to jurisdictions to which the transaction bears a ‘reasonable relation.’”  Id. § 
1-301 official cmt. 1.  The official comments continue: “Ordinarily the law chosen must be 
that of a jurisdiction where a significant enough portion of the making or performance of the 
contract is to occur or occurs.”  Id.  Thus, if the parties include a choice-of-law clause in 
their agreement, U.S. courts will generally enforce the parties’ choice of law, at least when 
the jurisdiction selected bears some relationship to the transaction or one or both of the 
parties, and perhaps even when it bears no such relationship.  If the parties have not 
effectively selected a jurisdiction’s law to govern their contract, U.S. courts will generally 
apply the UCC.  See id. § 1-301(b). 
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the general principles on which [the CISG] is based,” before the court may 
turn to domestic law.65  Still, courts should begin with the text of the CISG, 
but U.S. courts have simply not focused carefully enough on the actual text 
of the CISG before leaping to the comfortable UCC. 
II.  THE APPROACH PRESCRIBED BY THE CISG 
A.  The Text of the Treaty 
The CISG fundamentally is a multilateral treaty.  In order to 
understand how usage should be applied under the CISG, applicable 
international law governing treaty interpretation requires beginning with the 
text of the treaty itself.66 Usage can become part of the parties’ agreement 
under Article 9 of the CISG, and it is that article that is the focus of this 
analysis.  But the term “usage” is used in five different sub-articles of the 
CISG.67  Each is briefly described in this Part II.A. 
1.  Article 9 
Most important for analysis of the presumed hierarchical relationship 
between “usage” and other extrinsic sources of contract terms (and arguably 
for the role of usage under the CISG generally) is Article 9.68  Article 9 of 
the CISG establishes two means for usage to become a binding part of the 
agreement between the parties, either as an agreed-upon term or as an 
implied term. 
65 CISG, supra note 12, art. 7(2). 
66 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].  While the United States is not a party to the Vienna 
Convention, the Vienna Convention is widely recognized as a codification of customary 
international law governing treaties.  To the extent the Vienna Convention is a codification 
of customary international law, it is generally binding as a matter of international law even 
on those states that are not parties to the Vienna Convention.  See, e.g., Statute of the 
International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
67 See CISG, supra note 12, arts. 4, 8(3), 9(1), 9(2), & 18(3). 
68 Article 9 of the CISG provides in its entirety as follows: 
(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any 
practices which they have established between themselves. 
(2) The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made 
applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or 
ought to have known and which in international trade is widely known to, and 
regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular 
trade concerned. 
Id. art. 9. 
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a.  Usage as Agreed-Upon Term 
Article 9(1) of the CISG provides that “[t]he parties are bound by any 
usage to which they have agreed.”69  The parties are also bound under 
Article 9(1) by “any practices which they have established between 
themselves.”70  Quite simply, if there is a usage that the parties have agreed 
to or there is a practice that they have established between themselves, then 
the parties are contractually bound by such usage and by such practice. 
There are difficult questions that flow from this provision of the CISG 
and its application.  For example, how is a court to determine whether the 
parties have agreed to a usage?  What if it seems the parties have agreed to 
a usage, but the usage conflicts with an express term of the parties’ written 
agreement?  What if the usage conflicts with a practice the parties have 
established between themselves?  These questions, not answered explicitly 
by Article 9(1), must be considered in light of the general principles on 
which the CISG is based, discussed in Part II.B.71
b.  Usage as Implied Term 
Under Article 9(2), if certain requirements are satisfied, a usage can be 
deemed to have been made part of the parties’ agreement as an implied 
term.72  Article 9(2) provides as follows: 
The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have 
impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage 
of which the parties knew or ought to have known and which in 
international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, 
parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade 
concerned.73
By looking carefully at Article 9(2) and its constituent parts, it is plain 
to see that in order to determine whether a usage is an implied term of the 
parties’ agreement, the court must consider whether three distinct 
requirements are satisfied with respect to the usage in question: (i) whether 
the usage in question is a usage that each party either actually knew of or 
ought to have known of, (ii) whether in international trade the usage is 
widely known to parties to like contracts, and (iii) whether in international 
trade the usage is regularly observed by parties to like contracts. 
Article 9(2) also provides the parties with an ‘out.’  That is, if there is 
some usage that satisfies the three requirements of Article 9(2) that would 
automatically become a binding implied term of the parties’ agreement, the 
69 Id. art. 9(1). 
70 Id.
71 See id. art. 7(2). 
72 See id. art. 9(2). 
73 Id.
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parties are nevertheless free to agree that the usage is not part of their 
agreement.74 If they do so, then the parties’ agreement will prevail over the 
default inclusion of the usage as an implied term of their agreement under 
Article 9(2).  Thus, a sort of logical reasoning can be seen when the 
requirements of Article 9(2) can be satisfied, and the logical reasoning 
essentially provides as follows: 
Similarly situated third parties in international trade know about this 
usage, and those third parties abide by the usage. 
The parties to this contract also either knew or ought to have known 
about this usage, and they did not manifest agreement not to be 
bound by it. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to conclude that these parties intended to 
abide by the usage.
Of course, how the parties manifest agreement not to be bound by any 
such usage is a more difficult question.  Party conduct could provide 
evidence of agreement not to be bound by usage, but courts should not 
assume that apparently inconsistent party conduct should automatically 
prevail over usage that would be applicable under Article 9(2).  The 
Illustration in Part II.D. offers one example of how this could be so. 
When party conduct appears to constitute a course of dealing or course 
of performance under the UCC, the court should remember that those UCC 
concepts are not relevant for the Article 9 analysis.  Thus, party conduct 
should never prevail over usage simply because the court concludes that the 
conduct constitutes course of dealing or course of performance.  That is not 
the proper inquiry under the CISG.  Even when the conduct might be 
deemed to constitute a practice that the parties have established between 
themselves under the CISG, the conduct still should not automatically 
prevail over the usage simply because it constitutes established party 
practice.  The text of Article 9 does not direct courts to apply an automatic 
hierarchy, after all.75  Rather, to determine whether usage or party conduct 
should prevail in case of an apparent conflict, courts should be guided by 
the CISG principles of freedom of contract and determining party intent, 
discussed in Part II.B., and courts should conduct their analysis by using the 
analytical framework that is contemplated by Article 9. 
Ultimately it is important for courts, as well as practitioners and their 
clients, to recognize that under Article 9, a usage can become a binding 
term of the parties’ agreement, just as surely as if it were unambiguously 
written into the agreement.  If usage does become a binding term, it should 
74 See id.  Article 9(2) provides for usage and party practice to become implied terms of 
the parties’ agreement, “unless otherwise agreed.”  Id.
75 See id. art. 9. 
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be treated as any other contract term—which might require additional 
interpretation or analysis, as the analytical framework demonstrates. 
2.  Usage in other Articles of the CISG 
a.  Article 8(3) 
Even when a usage does not become part of the parties’ agreement 
under Article 9, usage can still be relevant under Article 8(3) of the CISG 
for determining the intent of the parties, including for purposes of 
interpreting the parties’ agreement.76  Courts are directed by Article 8(3) of 
the CISG to give “due consideration” to usage (among other things) when 
determining the actual intent of the parties, as well as when determining the 
understanding a reasonable person would have had with respect to 
statements made by a party or other conduct of a party.77  Notably, 
consideration of usage to determine party intent is mandatory, not 
permissive.78  That is, it is not simply the case that courts are permitted to 
consider usage; they are obligated under Article 8(3) to do so.  Moreover, 
there is no hierarchy established by Article 8(3) for usage relative to any 
other source a court is to consider when determining party intent. 
Unlike Article 9(2), Article 8(3) does not limit the scope of usage that 
is potentially relevant, in that Article 8(3) does not require the usage to be 
usage that the parties knew of or ought to have known of.79  Similarly, the 
role to be played by usage under Article 8(3) is not limited to usages that 
are widely known to or regularly observed by parties to like contracts in 
international trade.80  Rather, under Article 8(3), any usage—industry 
standards, customs in the trade, industry practices, and the like—can be 
considered for determining party intent to the extent the usage constitutes a 
“relevant circumstance.”81
Of course, it may be sensible for a court to give greater weight to 
usages that are known to the parties, as well as to usages that are widely 
known and regularly observed by parties to like contracts, when considering 
the role usage ought to play in the determination of party intent.  Arguably, 
this is appropriate under Article 8(3), in light of the need for the court to 
give “due consideration” to the usage as a “relevant” circumstance for 
76 See id. art. 8(3). 
77 CISG, supra note 12, art. 8(3).  Article 8(3) provides specifically as follows: “In 
determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person would have had, 
due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the 
negotiations, any practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages 
and any subsequent conduct of the parties.”  Id.
78 See id. (providing that due consideration “is to be given to all relevant circumstances,” 
including usage). 
79 See id.
80 See id.
81 See id.
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purposes of determining party intent; to the extent that the court concludes 
that the usage does not constitute a relevant circumstance, it is not helpful 
in determining party intent.  But there is no bright-line rule established 
under Article 8(3) regarding the weight to be given to any particular usage; 
the court is to give due consideration to any usage that either party offers as 
evidence of the parties’ intent.82  This is so, even when the usage is not a 
term of the contract. 
b.  Articles 4 and 18(3) 
There are two other sub-articles of the CISG that use the term usage—
Articles 4 and 18(3).83  Article 4 addresses principles of invalidity.84  Article 
4 provides that, except as otherwise expressly provided in the CISG, 
questions regarding the validity of the contract and its provisions and of any 
usage are outside the scope of the CISG.85  Such questions are therefore to 
be answered by means of Article 7, which requires settling such questions 
“in conformity with the general principles on which [the CISG] is based.”86
If there are no such principles, then the questions that are not settled by the 
CISG are to be settled “in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of 
the rules of private international law.”87  Of course, the validity of a usage 
as a contract term, as with any contract term, is only relevant when the 
usage is actually a term of the parties’ agreement.  Knowing whether a 
usage is a term of the parties’ agreement requires application of Article 9.
Article 18(3) describes what constitutes an acceptance in the formation 
of a contract under the CISG.88  That is, performance of an act alone 
normally cannot constitute acceptance (unless there is notice given to the 
offeror).89  But it is possible that an applicable usage could allow 
acceptance to occur by performance of an act (even without notice).90  Of 
course, knowing whether any such usage is applicable to the formation of 
82 See id.
83 See id. arts. 4 & 18(3). 
84 See id. art. 4. 
85 Id.
86 Id. art. 7(2). 
87 Id.
88 See id. art. 18(3). 
89 See id. art. 18(2). 
90 Article 18(3) provides as follows: 
However, if, by virtue of the offer or as a result of practices which the parties have 
established between themselves or of usage, the offeree may indicate assent by 
performing an act, such as one relating to the dispatch of the goods or payment of 
the price, without notice to the offeror, the acceptance is effective at the moment 
the act is performed, provided that the act is performed within the period of time 
laid down in the preceding paragraph. 
Id. art. 18(3). 
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the contract between the parties also requires application of the principles 
contained in Article 9. 
It is Article 9 that is ultimately the relevant article for determining 
whether a usage is a term of the parties’ agreement.  Courts should thus 
begin their analysis with the text of Article 9.  To the extent a question 
remains unanswered, the court should turn to the general principles on 
which the CISG is based for additional guidance.91
B.  General Principles 
As we seek to understand the role of usage under the CISG, it is 
important to note that the CISG itself offers instruction regarding how to 
interpret its provisions.  Whenever there is a question concerning a matter 
that is governed by the CISG and the question is not expressly settled by 
some provision of the CISG, the question is to be answered “in conformity 
with the general principles on which [the CISG] is based.”92  While the 
CISG does not define those general principles, a careful review of the CISG 
can reveal numerous principles that permeate the CISG.  This Article 
identifies two arguably relevant principles on which the CISG is based.  
Instead of resorting immediately to the UCC, courts should consider 
carefully the general principles on which the CISG is based.  Often that will 
obviate the need—indeed, the appropriateness—of turning to domestic sales 
law. 
1.  Freedom of Contract 
One fundamental principle on which the CISG is based is freedom of 
contract.93  The principle of freedom of contract permeates the CISG and its 
provisions.94  Freedom of contract is formalized in Article 6 of the CISG, 
which establishes clearly a right to depart from the default terms of the 
CISG.95
Article 6 is subject only to Article 12, which establishes the 
fundamental non-derogable terms of the CISG: 
Any provision of article 11,96 article 2997 or Part II98 of this 
91 See id. art. 7(2). 
92 Id.  If, and only if, there are no applicable general principles available to answer the 
question, then the question is to be answered “in conformity with the law applicable by 
virtue of the rules of private international law.”  Id.
93 See id. art. 6.  Article 6 establishes a very broad freedom of contract.  Subject only to 
Article 12 of the CISG, the parties may “derogate from or vary the effect of any of [the 
CISG’s] provisions.”  Id (emphasis added).
94 See, e.g., id. arts. 9(2), 35(2), 58(3) & 65(1). 
95 See id. art. 6. 
96 “A contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject 
to any other requirement as to form.  It may be proved by any means, including witnesses.”  
Id. art. 11. 
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Convention that allows a contract of sale or its modification or 
termination by agreement or any offer, acceptance or other indication 
of intention to be made in any form other than in writing does not 
apply where any party has his place of business in a Contracting 
State which has made a declaration under article 96 of this 
Convention.  The parties may not derogate from or vary the effect of 
this article.99
Article 12 has a limited effect for two reasons.  First, the scope of 
Article 12 is limited in that it relates only to domestic requirements as to 
form.100  Second, not many parties to the CISG (currently 11 out of 78 
parties) have made a declaration under Article 96; the United States has not 
made such a declaration.101
While some domestic sales laws establish broad categories of non-
derogable terms, such as duties of good faith, reasonableness, and the like 
(this is so under the UCC, for example),102 the CISG simply does not.103
97 Article 29(1) provides that “[a] contract may be modified or terminated by the mere 
agreement of the parties.”  Id. art. 29(1).  Paragraph (2) of Article 29 continues: 
A contract in writing which contains a provision requiring any modification or 
termination by agreement to be in writing may not be otherwise modified or 
terminated by agreement.  However, a party may be precluded by his conduct from 
asserting such a provision to the extent that the other party has relied on that 
conduct. 
Id. art. 29(2). 
98 Part II of the CISG is concerned with formation of the contract.  See id. Part.II. 
99 Id. art. 12. 
100 That is, Article 96 of the CISG allows parties to the CISG to declare that domestic 
writing requirements, such as a domestic statute of frauds, will be effective, notwithstanding 
the terms of the CISG that reject writing requirements, see CISG, supra note 12, art. 96, and 
Article 12 provides that when an Article 96 declaration has been made, the domestic 
requirements as to form prevail over the CISG’s rejection of requirements as to form.  See id.
art. 12. 
101 See CISG Status, supra note 12. 
102 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-302(b) (2011). 
103 For a contrary view, see LOOKOFSKY, supra note 20, at 165 (“The validity 
(enforceability) of a standard term which (e.g.) purports to disclaim the obligations set forth 
in Article 35(2) and/or limit liability in the event of breach is a question outside the CISG: 
the Convention is simply ‘not concerned with’ the validity of clauses like these.”).  
However, this view of the CISG is not supported by the text of the CISG.  It is true that the 
CISG is not concerned with the validity of the contract or of any of the contract’s provisions.  
See CISG, supra note 12, art. 4.  But that is so with respect to the validity of any clause in 
the contract; there is no special treatment accorded to clauses purporting to limit either 
party’s liability.  Indeed, the CISG contemplates in other sections that a contract could 
include such a clause.  See, e.g., id. art. 19(3) (addressing how a contract term relating to the 
“extent of one party’s liability to the other” should be analyzed in the battle of the forms).  
The explanatory note supports this as well: “[W]hen a question concerning a matter 
governed by this Convention is not expressly settled in it, the question is to be settled in 
conformity with the general principles on which the Convention is based.  Only in the 
absence of such principles should the matter be settled in conformity with the law applicable 
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Moreover, the CISG does not contain the same hurdles to modification of 
certain important terms, such as warranty terms, that other bodies of sales 
law contain.104  Thus, parties generally have the autonomy to mutually 
define their will regarding their respective contractual rights and duties.  
The principle of freedom of contract under the CISG generally compels a 
court to defer to the discernible will of the parties. 
Ultimately, the principle of freedom of contract should inform and 
guide a court’s approach to analysis of the CISG and the application of its 
terms to a contract governed by the CISG.  When the court can determine 
the parties’ will, that will should generally govern.  That naturally leads to 
the next question, which is how best to determine the will of the parties 
under the CISG.  It leads also to the next general principle on which the 
CISG is based: the principle of determining party intent. 
2.  Determining Party Intent 
Article 8 of the CISG establishes fundamental principles regarding the 
need to determine and the manner of determining party intent.105  Article 8 
does two especially important things.  First, it provides that the actual intent 
of the parties prevails over an inconsistent objective manifestation of intent 
when the actual intent of the parties can be determined.106  Second, it adopts 
a very broad approach for determining party intent by requiring courts to 
consider “all relevant circumstances.”107
Article 8 of the CISG provides as follows: 
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and 
other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent 
where the other party knew or could not have been unaware what 
that intent was. 
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by 
and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the 
understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other 
party would have had in the same circumstances. 
by virtue of the rules of private international law.”  Id., Explanatory Note, ¶ 13. 
104 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2011) (establishing specific requirements as to form and 
content that must be satisfied for the UCC implied warranties of merchantability and fitness 
for particular purpose to be excluded under U.C.C. § 2-316(2)); cf. CISG, supra note 12, art. 
35(2) (providing for warranties to exist by implication in a contract governed by the CISG, 
except when the parties have “agreed otherwise,” and providing no specific requirements as 
to form or content for such agreement). 
105 See CISG, supra note 12, art. 8.  For additional analysis by the author of the important 
role that Article 8 should play in a court’s analysis of a contract governed by the CISG, see 
Johnson, supra note 11, 266–87. 
106 See CISG, supra note 12, art. 8. 
107 Id. art. 8(3). 
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(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a 
reasonable person would have had, due consideration is to be given 
to all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, 
any practices which the parties have established between themselves, 
usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties.108
Under Article 8(3), the court must give due consideration to all 
relevant circumstances of the case.  Article 8(3) provides specific examples 
of items that are relevant circumstances, including the parties’ negotiations, 
established party practice, the parties’ conduct following formation of the 
contract, and usage.109  Courts must give due consideration to any and all of 
these items in order to determine the intent of the parties, whether 
determining actual intent or objective manifestation of intent.110  Each party 
must be given the opportunity to use such evidence to show that the parties 
agreed on an actual understanding of their bargain, even when the evidence 
might be inconsistent with the objective understanding that would otherwise 
be given to the parties’ bargain.111
Looking carefully at Article 8, one can see that a party to a robust 
written agreement, signed by both parties, might seek to introduce extrinsic 
evidence of a “[practice] which the parties have established between 
themselves”112 that tends to show that the parties have agreed outside the 
four corners of their written agreement on an allocation of risk or 
responsibility that seems to contradict the apparent allocation contained in 
the written agreement.  It is further possible that one of the parties might 
introduce evidence of an applicable usage that further contradicts both the 
party practice and the objective understanding of the express terms of the 
written agreement.  Courts must consider such evidence. 
This is likely to be culturally difficult for some U.S. courts, 
commentators, and practitioners, due to the sanctity under the U.S. parol 
evidence rule of the written word.113  While the parol evidence rule of the 
UCC would specifically preclude the possibility of such contradictory 
evidence of the practice and of the usage when the writing is a final 
expression of the parties’ agreement,114 Article 8 of the CISG specifically 
calls for the court to give due consideration to the evidence of the party 
108 Id. art. 8. 
109 Id. art. 8(3). 
110 See id. art. 8. 
111 See id.
112 Id. art. 8(3) 
113 See U.C.C. § 2-202 (2011) (providing that when the parties have put their agreement 
in writing that constitutes a final expression of their agreement, those parties are then 
prevented by the parol evidence rule from introducing any evidence of extrinsic terms that 
would contradict the writing, and if the writing is a complete and exclusive statement of their 
agreement, then the parties are largely prevented from introducing evidence of even 
consistent terms). 
114 See id.
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practice and of the usage.115  Moreover, while the UCC establishes an order 
of precedence for usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of 
performance, Article 8 does not. 
It is true that the writing, as an objective manifestation of the parties’ 
mutual intent to be bound, might ultimately prove to be the very best 
evidence available of the actual intent of the parties, and it could be that 
party practice might prove to be better evidence than usage of actual party 
intent.  But this is not always true.  Under the principles established by 
Article 8, the writing is not dispositive of the parties’ intent, and party 
practice does not automatically prevail over usage when determining party 
intent. 
Like the principle of freedom of contract, the need to determine and 
the method of determining party intent should inform and guide a court’s 
approach to analysis of the CISG and the application of its terms to a 
contract governed by the CISG.  It is this principle that should inform the 
court’s construction of any priority given to sources of the terms of a 
contract governed by the CISG. 
C.  Discerning the Hierarchy 
When there is usage that arguably has become part of the parties’ 
agreement through either Article 9(1), because the parties have agreed upon 
that usage, or Article 9(2), because the usage satisfies the three discrete 
requirements of Article 9(2) and the parties have not opted out of the usage, 
such usage is as much part of the parties’ agreement as if it were written 
into the written agreement.  Any such usage will clearly prevail over default 
provisions of the CISG, in accordance with the principle of freedom of 
contract.116  But what if the usage conflicts with another express term of the 
parties’ written agreement?  Or with practices which the parties have 
established between themselves?  How do those distinct sources of contract 
terms relate to each other? 
Some commentators have argued persuasively that a practice 
established by the parties between themselves ought to prevail over any 
usage that would otherwise be part of the parties’ agreement as an implied 
term under Article 9(2).117  This view of Article 9 can be justified by the 
“unless otherwise agreed” clause of Article 9(2).118  Article 9(2) provides 
for usage to become an implied term of the parties’ agreement when the 
115 See CISG, supra note 12, art. 8(3). 
116 See id. art. 6.  “Taken together, Articles 6 and 9 confirm that the CISG default regime 
plays ‘second fiddle’ to the specific kind of consensus often reached between merchants 
working within the relevant trade environment (what some jurists aptly label the ‘bargain in 
fact’).”  LOOKOFSKY, supra note 20, at 44. 
117 See, e.g., Franco Ferrari, What Sources of Law for Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods? Why One Has to Look Beyond the CISG, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 314, 335–36 
(2005). 
118 CISG, supra note 12, art. 9(2). 
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requirements of Article 9(2) are satisfied with respect to the usage in 
question, but it also explicitly allows the parties to otherwise agree.119  To 
the extent that the parties can be deemed to have agreed that a practice 
established between themselves is binding on them, if it conflicts with an 
Article 9(2) usage, the parties have arguably implicitly otherwise agreed 
that the usage is not part of their agreement.  The argument has merit, and it 
is one way that a conflict between an Article 9(2) usage and an Article 9(1) 
party practice could be reconciled. 
However, the text of Article 9 does not require such an order of 
precedence in every instance.120  Rather, Article 9(2) establishes a 
mechanism for usage to become an implied term of the parties’ agreement 
(when the requirements of Article 9(2) are satisfied) unless the parties have 
otherwise agreed.  How the parties manifest such agreement is not 
addressed by Article 9(2). 
In addition, Article 9(1) provides that party practice can bind the 
parties, but, unlike usage under Article 9(1), party practices are not binding 
on the parties under Article 9(1) specifically as a result of party 
agreement.121 Rather, it occurs when the parties have “established” the 
practice between themselves.122  How the parties can establish the practice 
between themselves is not addressed by Article 9.123  In addition, because 
Article 9(1) refers specifically to party agreement with respect to usage that 
is binding on the parties and does not refer to party agreement with respect 
to party practice it should not be assumed that an established party practice 
necessarily is something to which the parties have agreed in the sense of 
Article 9(2). 
An order of precedence between party practice that is binding on the 
parties under Article 9(2) and usage that is binding on the parties under 
Article 9(1) is therefore simply not established by Article 9.  Rather, courts 
are bound to determine which contract term—the party practice or the 
applicable usage—the parties intended should prevail.  To determine that 
party intent, courts should use the principles set forth in Article 8.  In so 
doing, the court may determine that the parties intended the express terms 
of a writing to prevail over inconsistent party practice and usage and that 
the parties intended some party practice to prevail over usage as a matter of 
fact.  However, it is important to recognize that the CISG does not compel 
such an outcome as a matter of law, and it is improper to conclude as a 
matter of law that party practice will trump an inconsistent usage every 
time.  Rather, careful factual inquiry and thoughtful analysis of the facts 
found should be used to determine what the parties actually intended. 
119 See id.
120 See id. art. 9. 
121 See id. art. 9(1). 
122 Id.
123 See id. art. 9. 
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D.  Usage Intended to Prevail over Practice: An Illustration 
An illustration helps to explain how not assuming that party practice 
automatically prevails over usage can facilitate respecting the actual intent 
of the parties.  Imagine the following situation: 
Seller is a Spanish corporation with its place of business in Spain.  
Seller designs, produces, markets, and installs customized, complex 
systems for use in a variety of industrial packaging and labeling 
applications.  Buyer is a Delaware corporation with its place of 
business in the United States.  Buyer is a supplier of automotive 
products to the automotive industry and also supplies replacement 
parts to consumers through automotive parts dealers.  Buyer uses 
packaging and labeling systems for its products. 
Buyer plans to update and expand its manufacturing capacity and 
requires six new packaging and labeling systems.  Each system will 
be shipped and installed individually over a period of eighteen 
months.  Each will be customized to fit the facility where it will be 
used. 
Buyer and Seller negotiate and agree on the basic terms of a deal for 
the first system, including price, delivery date, warranty terms, and 
the like (but not choice of law), and the parties reduce their 
agreement to a writing, which both parties sign. 
Within the applicable industry, both inspection and acceptance 
testing of the systems are customary, including for cross-border 
transactions.  The inspection and acceptance testing process 
routinely occur in two stages: the first stage customarily occurs at 
the seller’s plant of manufacture prior to shipment, and the second 
stage consists of a final acceptance test that takes place at the 
buyer’s facility after installation is complete.  It is customary in this 
industry globally for the seller to bear the cost of such inspection 
and testing (and the anticipated cost is typically built into the quote 
and pricing for the equipment).  Seller and Buyer are both aware of 
all of the foregoing.  The written agreement signed by Seller and 
Buyer is silent on inspection and testing. 
Seller commences performance and produces, delivers, and installs 
the system.  Buyer inspects the system and completes an acceptance 
test only after delivery and installation.  Buyer is satisfied with the 
system, and the parties then execute a written agreement for a 
second system, with different specifications and a new price and 
delivery location and date, but otherwise identical to the first written 
agreement.  The parties perform under the second agreement.  
Satisfied with the second system, Buyer decides to order the final 
four systems, and the parties enter into a third written agreement, 
this time for all four of the remaining systems Buyer wishes to 
purchase.  Seller commences performance, delivering and installing 
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first one and then another system under the third written agreement. 
During the course of production, delivery, and installation of the 
first four systems (the individual systems under the first two written 
agreements and the two systems under the third written agreement), 
Buyer inspects and completes acceptance testing only at its facility 
each time. 
Upon delivery and installation of the fourth system, it becomes 
evident to both parties that the system is defective and out of 
specification, which appears at first blush to be due to 
manufacturing error. 
Seller quickly proposes a commercial solution at its expense, and 
Buyer agrees.  Seller repairs the defect and nonconformity to 
Buyer’s satisfaction.
Now, however, Buyer informs Seller that it intends to exercise its 
industry right to inspect and test the final two systems at Seller’s 
facility, at Seller’s expense, prior to shipment.  Seller resists, arguing 
that there have been three systems with no problem; that Seller 
accepted responsibility for the problems with the fourth; and that 
there is therefore no need for costly and time-consuming pre-
shipment inspection or testing by Buyer.  (Unbeknownst to Buyer, 
Seller has not accounted for the costs of pre-shipment inspection and 
testing when quoting the prices for these six systems due to an 
internal miscommunication.  Seller also reasonably fears that this 
would cause delay in its performance, which would put Seller in 
breach.)  Buyer replies that it is unwilling to accept delivery of the 
final two systems without pre-shipment inspection and testing at 
Seller’s expense; and Buyer is going to insist on its industry-
standard right to inspect and test at Seller’s facility at Seller’s 
expense.  Seller argues that the parties have established both a 
course of dealing and a course of performance that render any such 
industry practice irrelevant. 
Ultimately unable to resolve their disagreement, the parties find 
themselves in litigation, with claims and counter-claims for breach 
of contract, each party claiming that the other party has unjustifiably 
refused to perform.
In order to determine which party is in breach by not performing, the 
court hearing the parties’ respective claims will likely have to determine 
whether the usage relating to pre-shipment inspection and testing is part of 
the parties’ agreement, whether the parties’ practices have established a 
term of their agreement, or both.  If it is both, then the court will have to 
determine which term the parties intended to prevail. 
On its face, it appears that the parties have established a UCC course 
of performance under the final written agreement and a course of dealing 
Elevating “Usage” to its Rightful Position For Contracts Governed by the CISG 
32:263 (2012) 
289 
under the previous two agreements for inspection and acceptance testing of 
the systems to occur after delivery only.124  Applying Treibacher Industrie, 
it would be fairly simple to conclude that the parties’ apparent course of 
dealing prevails over any potentially applicable usage that would call for a 
different outcome, obviating the need for any analysis of the parties’ intent 
regarding the role usage should play, with the result that the parties’ 
contract only requires inspection and testing to occur after delivery has 
occurred.  But that is problematic at several levels.  The CISG, which 
governs the transaction in this Illustration,125 requires a different analysis. 
The CISG requires the court not to consider whether there is a course 
of dealing or a course of performance—UCC terms and concepts that are 
not reproduced in the CISG—but instead to determine whether there are 
any practices which they have established between themselves.126
Moreover, repeated performance in a particular way does not 
automatically amount to a practice that the parties have established between 
themselves.127  Because Article 9 tells us little regarding how to determine 
whether the parties have established a practice between themselves, it is 
necessary to consider the general principles on which the CISG is based to 
make such a determination.128  One such principle, established by Article 8, 
is the principle of determining party intent, and it is therefore appropriate to 
analyze whether the parties have even established a practice that they 
intended to be bound by, with a preference for actual intent if it can be 
determined.
Finally, even if we were to conclude that the parties have established a 
practice between themselves, Article 9 does not provide that practices 
established by the parties between themselves should automatically prevail 
over a conflicting usage that is otherwise applicable to the parties’ 
agreement.129  Rather, general principles on which the CISG is based should 
once again inform the court’s consideration of the precedence that should 
be given.
Thus, the court must analyze usage described in the Illustration and its 
relationship with apparent party practice in a way that is actually 
contemplated by the CISG.  It is entirely possible that a court would 
conclude that the parties intended the usage concerning pre-shipment 
testing and acceptance to be part of their agreement.  It is possible that the 
practice established by the first four instances of performance was not 
124 See U.C.C. § 1-303(a)–(b) (2011). 
125 Because the underlying contract is a contract of sale of goods between parties who 
have their respective places of business in different countries (Spain and the United States), 
and those countries are both parties to the CISG, the CISG applies by its terms.  See CISG, 
supra note 12, art. 1(1)(a). 
126 Id. art. 9(1). 
127 See id.
128 See id. art. 7(2). 
129 See id. art. 9. 
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intended to establish a different term of the parties’ agreement but was 
instead merely a non-binding waiver by Buyer of an assertion of its 
contractual rights in those instances.  In that case, application of the 
Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Treibacher Industrie would yield the wrong 
result. 
Fortunately, the analysis contemplated by the CISG is not unwieldy.  
Careful review of Article 9 and the general principles on which the CISG is 
based suggests a useful analytical framework for dealing with difficult 
questions under Article 9.
III.  ARTICLE 9 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
By marching carefully through a series of four questions while 
suspending UCC bias and assumptions, courts can analyze issues under 
Article 9 and apply Article 9 in a way that is actually contemplated by the 
CISG. 
First, is there any usage to which the parties have agreed under 
Article 9(1)?  When determining the answer to this question, it is important 
to note that such usage need not be a usage observed in international trade, 
and it need not be widely known or regularly observed by third parties.130  It 
is enough that the contracting parties have in some way agreed to be bound 
by the usage, have agreed to observe the usage, have agreed to make the 
usage applicable to their agreement, or have otherwise explicitly or 
implicitly agreed to the usage.131  Article 9(1) requires no particular means 
of manifesting such agreement; it is a simple factual inquiry. 
If a party claims that a usage is part of a contract under Article 9(1), it 
is up to the finder of fact to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the 
parties have agreed to the usage.  And the party arguing for application of 
the usage should bear the burden of showing that the parties have so agreed.  
Part of the analysis should focus on whether the parties actually intended to 
be bound by the usage, and that analysis should be grounded in the 
principles contained in Article 8. 
If the finder of fact finds that the parties have agreed to the usage, then 
the usage is a term of the parties’ agreement.  However, that does not 
necessarily end the analysis.  Sometimes a contract term is not enforceable 
because it conflicts with another contract term.  The continuing analysis 
using the Article 9 analytical framework will help determine whether the 
conflicting term is enforceable.  But as a starting point, it is important to 
recognize that the usage is, in fact, a term of the parties’ agreement, just as 
surely as if it were written into the agreement itself. 
Second, is there any practice that the parties have established 
between themselves under Article 9(1)?  It is important to note that the 
130 See id. art. 9(1). 
131 See id.; see also id. art. 6. 
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parties may have established a practice between themselves with or without 
consciously agreeing to the practice.  It is also important to note that a 
practice may be established between the parties without constituting a 
course of performance or a course of dealing under the UCC.  Indeed, it is 
inappropriate for courts to refer to or draw upon those UCC concepts when 
analyzing whether the parties have established a practice between 
themselves.  Notably, Article 9(1) itself requires no particular means of 
demonstrating that a practice has been established by the parties.132  Once 
again, this requires a factual inquiry to determine whether, as a matter of 
fact, the parties have established a practice between themselves, and Article 
8(3) of the CISG requires consideration of all relevant circumstances to 
determine whether the parties intended to establish a practice between 
themselves. 
If a party claims that a practice is part of a contract under Article 9(1), 
it is up to the finder of fact to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the 
parties have established the practice between themselves.  The party 
arguing for application of the party practice should bear the burden of 
showing that the parties have established the practice between themselves.  
Part of the analysis should focus on whether the parties actually intended to 
establish a practice between themselves or intended to be bound by a 
practice.  That analysis should be grounded in the principles contained in 
Article 8. 
If the finder of fact finds that the parties have established the practice 
between themselves, then the party practice is a term of the parties’ 
agreement.  This is so, even if the term based on the established party 
practice conflicts with a usage that constitutes a term under Article 9(1).  
Article 9(1) does not address how those conflicting terms should be 
reconciled.133  Thus, once again, the analysis is not yet complete, but we 
know that the party practice is, in fact, a term of the parties’ agreement.
Third, is there any usage that constitutes an implied term of the 
parties’ agreement under Article 9(2)?  This third question requires a more 
involved, two-part analysis.  The first part of the analysis focuses on 
whether the usage is the type of usage that falls within the scope of Article 
9(2). 
In order to determine whether a usage is within the scope of Article 
9(2), and therefore potentially an implied term of the parties’ agreement, the 
court must consider whether three distinct requirements are satisfied with 
respect to the usage in question.134
(i) Did each party know, or ought each party to have known, of the 
claimed usage? 
132 See id. art. 9(1). 
133 See id.
134 See id. art. 9(2). 
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(ii) Is the claimed usage a usage that in international trade is widely 
known to parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular 
trade concerned? 
(iii) Is the claimed usage a usage that in international trade is 
regularly observed by parties to contracts of the type involved in the 
particular trade concerned? 
The party arguing for application of the usage as an implied term 
should bear the burden of showing that these three requirements have been 
satisfied.  If the answer to any of these three questions is “no,” then the 
usage is not part of the parties’ agreement under Article 9(2).
If the answer to each of the questions is “yes” and the usage is 
therefore the type of usage that falls within the scope of Article 9(2), then 
the second part of the analysis asks whether the parties nevertheless opted 
out of the usage.  Specifically, did the parties agree not to have impliedly 
made applicable to their contract the usage in question? 
It is important to note that the inquiry in the second part of the analysis 
is not whether the parties affirmatively agreed to make the usage applicable 
to their contract.  Such affirmative agreement is not required under Article 
9(2).135  In fact, if there is such affirmative agreement, then Article 9(1) is 
the appropriate section to apply.136  Rather, the inquiry is whether the 
parties have agreed not to make the usage a part of their agreement.  
Notably, however, Article 9(2) requires no particular means of manifesting 
that agreement.137  Once again, it requires factual inquiry to determine 
whether the parties have manifested such agreement. 
Once the first part of the analysis shows that there is a usage that is 
applicable under Article 9(2), then the burden should shift to the party who 
would like to evade application of the usage as an implied term of the 
parties’ agreement to show that the parties opted out of it. 
If a party claims that a usage is part of a contract of sale of goods 
under Article 9(2), it is up to the finder of fact to determine whether, as a 
matter of fact, the usage is the type of usage that is within the scope of 
Article 9(2) by applying the first part of the two-part analysis.  If the other 
party then claims that the parties have nevertheless opted out of the usage, 
then it is up to the finder of fact to determine whether that other party has 
met its burden to show that the parties have in fact opted out of the usage.  
If the finder of fact finds that the usage is the type of usage that is within the 
scope of Article 9(2) and does not find that the parties have opted out of the 
usage, then the usage is a term of the parties’ agreement.  This is so, even if 
the usage conflicts with another contractual term that is based on 
established party practice under Article 9(1).  How those conflicting 
135 See id.
136 See id. art. 9(1). 
137 See id. art. 9(2). 
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contractual terms should be reconciled is not expressly addressed in Article 
9. 
Fourth, we’ve identified terms of the contract under Article 9; do any 
of these terms conflict with each other or with another apparent express 
term of the contract?  If so, which term prevails?  If none of the terms 
conflict with each other, then each is enforceable as a binding term of the 
parties’ agreement (in the absence of an applicable domestic principle of 
invalidity rendering the term unenforceable).138
If there is a conflict, then the conflict must be resolved.  Because the 
text of Article 9 does not establish an order of precedence, the conflict must 
be resolved by reference to the general principles on which the CISG is 
based.139
As we have seen, the principle of freedom of contract enshrined in 
Article 6 generally requires deference to the will of the parties.  And the 
principles pertaining to determining party intent established in Article 8 
require deference to the parties’ actual intent, if actual intent can be 
determined, and to objective intent, if actual intent cannot be determined, 
after giving due consideration to all relevant circumstances.140
Thus, the objective of the finder of fact should be to determine whether 
the parties actually intended one contractual term to prevail over another.  If 
determinable, that actual intent should establish the order of precedence.  If 
actual intent is not determinable, then the fact finder should focus on the 
objective manifestation of the parties’ intent regarding the order of 
precedence.  In either case, the inquiry should be fact-intensive and 
conducted on a case-by-case basis.  Such an inquiry should focus on all of 
the evidence available, including party communications, party conduct, and 
usage.  Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the fact finder to find the facts 
by weighing all available evidence as best the fact finder can, and to make a 
determination that does not assume any hierarchy. 
IV.  THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE CISG 
The travaux préparatoires support the foregoing analytical framework.  
When the text of a treaty is insufficient to answer a question definitively, 
the treaty’s travaux préparatoires, or drafting history, should be considered.  
Specifically, a treaty’s drafting history is relevant to confirm the text, 
context, object, and purpose of the treaty, and to resolve ambiguity, as well 
as to prevent a manifestly absurd or unjust result.141  It is therefore 
138 See id. art. 4. 
139 See id. art. 7(2). 
140 See id. art. 8. 
141 See Vienna Convention, supra note 66, arts. 31(2) & 32.  U.S. courts, in particular, 
have shown a willingness to use a treaty’s travaux préparatoires to interpret the treaty.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325 
reporters’ n.1 (1987) (“United States courts, accustomed to analyzing legislative materials, 
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important to consider what, if anything, the travaux préparatoires tell us 
about the hierarchical relationship between applicable usage and other 
means of determining the contents of the parties’ contract. 
A draft of the CISG was prepared by the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and a diplomatic conference of 
plenipotentiaries consisting of representatives of 62 independent states, 
including the United States, was convened in 1980 to consider the draft.142
Close examination of the travaux préparatoires of the conference reveals 
that the drafters considered an amendment to Article 9 that would have had 
the effect of creating a hierarchy as between usage and party conduct. 
The First Committee of the Conference considered the draft 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods approved by 
UNCITRAL.143  And several amendments to Article 9 (numbered in the 
draft as Article 8) were proposed.144  An amendment proposed by Pakistan 
would have placed usage in a subsidiary position to the conduct of the 
parties by proposing the following amendment: “Replace the words ‘unless 
otherwise agreed’ in paragraph (2) of article [9] by the words ‘unless their 
conduct shows otherwise’.”145  Later, the Pakistan representative clarified 
that the proposed language was to be added to Article 9(2) without 
replacing any text.146  Thus, Article 9(2) would have read as follows: 
have not been hesitant to resort to travaux préparatoires.”).
142 See United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
Vienna, Austria, Mar. 10–Apr. 11, 1980, Final Act of the United Nations Conference on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, ¶¶ 1–3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (Apr. 11, 
1980), reprinted in United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, Official Records, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19, at 176–77 (1991) [hereinafter Official 
Records], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/a-conf-97-19-
ocred-e.pdf; see also CISG, supra note 12, CISG Explanatory Note, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf. 
143 United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 
Austria, Mar. 10–Apr. 11, 1980, Text of Draft Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods approved by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/5 (Mar. 14, 1979), reprinted in Official Records, supra note 142, at 
5–14. 
144 “Amendments were submitted to [Article 8] by China (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.24), 
Czechoslovakia (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.40), India (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.34), Sweden 
(A/CONF.97/C.1/L.19), Pakistan (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.64), United States of America 
(A/CONF.97/C.1/L.6), France (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.23) and Egypt (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.44).” 
United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 
Austria, Mar. 10–Apr. 11, 1980, Report of the First Committee, art. 8, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.97/11 (Apr. 7, 1980) [hereinafter Report of the First Committee], reprinted in
Official Records, supra note 142, at 89. 
145 Id. ¶ 3(v) [sic]. 
146 United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 
Austria, Mar. 10–Apr. 11, 1980, Summary Records of the First Committee, 7th Meeting, ¶ 
26, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.1/SR.7 (Mar. 14, 1980) [hereinafter Summary Records–7th 
Meeting], reprinted in Official Records, supra note 142, at 266. 
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The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed or unless their 
conduct shows otherwise, to have impliedly made applicable to their 
contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought 
to have known and which in international trade is widely known to, 
and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in 
the particular trade concerned. 
That amendment arguably would have had the effect of creating an 
automatic hierarchy between usage that would otherwise be part of the 
parties’ agreement under Article 9(2) and inconsistent party conduct.  But 
the Pakistan amendment was rejected, and no hierarchy was established.147
One delegate’s explanation for his opposition underscores why it is 
sensible not to assume that party practice should automatically prevail over 
binding usage: 
Mr. HJERNER (Sweden) said that the Pakistan amendment 
(A/CONF.97/C.1/L.64) seemed attractive at first sight but raised the 
question of what conduct was relevant for purposes of interpretation, 
especially in regard to implied acceptance.  Doubts came 
immediately to mind regarding the relevant time: was the conduct in 
question the conduct at the time of conclusion of the contract or that 
of a later time, when a reluctant party failed to comply with the 
custom in question?  He accordingly urged that the text should be 
left as it stood.148
Thus, the absence of an automatic hierarchy between usage and party 
practice is the result of an apparently deliberate, reasoned decision. 
V.  RECENT CONTINUATION OF IMPROPER IMPOSITION OF 
AUTOMATIC HIERARCHY 
Nevertheless, the absence of an automatic hierarchy has not yet been 
recognized by U.S. courts.  This particular misunderstanding and 
misapplication of Article 9 of the CISG continues as U.S. courts continue to 
have difficulty recognizing the analysis required under Article 9 in light of 
the general principles on which the CISG is based. 
A.  Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc.
Early in 2011, a U.S. federal court heard a case involving a contract 
dispute that grew out of a battle of the forms.149  The question of contract 
formation was governed by the CISG.150  On cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the plaintiff, Hanwha Corporation (“Hanwha”), a Korean 
147 Report of the First Committee, supra note 144 ¶ 6. 
148 Summary Records–7th Meeting, supra note 146, ¶ 28 (emphasis added). 
149 Hanwha Corp., 760 F. Supp. 2d at 428–29. 
150 See id. at 431. 
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company and the would-be buyer in the sale of goods transaction at issue, 
argued that summary judgment was inappropriate because disputed issues 
of fact “regarding the norms of contracting practices in the Korean 
petrochemicals industry” remained unresolved.151  Citing no authority, the 
court perfunctorily dismissed that argument, reasoning that when “parties 
have established a course of dealing between themselves, industry norms 
that might otherwise apply are irrelevant.”152  That statement, of course, is 
simply not true under the CISG.  Unfortunately for Hanwha, the court 
improperly denied it the opportunity to show that the parties actually 
intended the norms of contracting practices in the Korean petrochemicals 
industry to constitute a part of their agreement. 
To be clear, Hanwha should not have automatically prevailed on the 
merits of its argument regarding Korean norms even if the court applied the 
analytical framework required by Article 9.  Hanwha would have been 
required to meet its burden of showing that the norm constituted a part of 
the agreement as usage under either Article 9(1) or Article 9(2).  Then, to 
the extent the usage conflicted with another term, the court would have 
been required to determine that the usage in question was intended by the 
parties to prevail over the other term.  That might have been difficult.  Still, 
Hanwha should have had the opportunity to offer evidence showing that the 
norms were part of the parties’ agreement under Article 9.
Because the court provided no authority for its conclusion,153 it is 
unclear what it was that led the court to its conclusion.  However, it 
certainly seems likely that this conclusion was grounded in the court’s 
understanding of the UCC.  Indeed, earlier in its opinion the court reasoned 
that UCC analysis could be appropriate when the CISG provision at issue is 
analogous to a UCC provision.154  Similarly, the court seems to be 
implicitly reasoning that course of dealing prevails over inconsistent usage 
of trade, which would be accurate under the UCC.155 Finally, the court’s 
reference to course of dealing betrays the court’s unfortunate ignorance of 
the applicable provisions of the CISG. 
B.  Geneva Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.
In another example, Geneva Pharmaceuticals, a complex case 
involving numerous parties, antitrust and breach-of-contract claims, and 
151 Id. at 433. 
152 Id.
153 See id.
154 See id. at 430. 
155 See U.C.C. § 1-303(e)(3) (2011).  Even under the UCC, however, the court would 
nevertheless be obligated to consider usage of trade and to attempt to reconcile applicable 
course of dealing and usage of trade that appear to be inconsistent with each other.  See id.
(“Except as otherwise provided in subsection (f), the express terms of an agreement and any 
applicable course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade must be construed 
whenever reasonable as consistent with each other.”).
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complicated facts, the U.S. bias and disregard for the text of the CISG was 
especially egregious.156  The court determined that the CISG governed the 
sales contract at issue.157  In its recitation of potentially applicable 
provisions of the CISG, the court wildly mischaracterized Article 9, 
misstating the method of determining whether usage and party practice are 
terms of the parties’ agreement: “The usages and practices of the parties or 
the industry are automatically incorporated into any agreement governed by 
the [CISG], unless expressly excluded by the parties.”158  Despite its 
conclusion that the CISG governed, the court ultimately relied on non-CISG 
case law, including a 1949 decision that predated the CISG, to conclude 
that a party could not “rely on industry custom to trump an agreed-upon 
obligation.”159  In that portion of the court’s analysis, the court never even 
considered Article 9 of the CISG, opting instead to rely on non-CISG case 
law.160
VI.  FAILING TO CONSIDER USAGE 
Courts are not the only ones to misunderstand Article 9.  Contracting 
parties also do not always recognize the roles usage can play under Articles 
8 and 9 of the CISG and therefore sometimes fail to make the argument that 
usage ought to help define the terms of the contract or party intent. 
A.  Contract Formation 
In one of the early decisions by a U.S. court applying Article 9 of the 
CISG, the court had before it a motion for summary judgment in a dispute 
involving an Italian seller of shoes, Calzaturificio Claudia S.n.c. (Claudia), 
and a U.S buyer, Olivieri Footwear Ltd. (Olivieri).161  Claudia brought a 
breach of contract claim (among other claims) against Olivieri and moved 
for summary judgment on the basis of Claudia’s invoices and the delivery 
terms set forth in those invoices.162
In considering the motion, the court applied the CISG.163  The court 
correctly recognized that, under the CISG, it was required to consider a 
broader spectrum of evidence than it normally would under the UCC.164
Claudia’s invoices certainly constituted one kind of evidence of party intent 
that was appropriate for the court to consider.  In addition, the court 
156 See Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 281–85 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 386 F.3d 485 (2d Cir. 2004). 
157 See id. at 281 n.26. 
158 Id. at 281. 
159 Id. at 284. 
160 See id. at 281–85. 
161 See Claudia, 1998 WL 164824 at *1. 
162 See id. at *1–2. 
163 See id. at *4. 
164 See id. at *5. 
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recognized the need to consider other evidence, including “[e]vidence 
concerning any negotiations, agreements, or statements made prior to the 
issuance of the invoices in issue . . . .”165  It quoted Article 9 of the CISG, 
reasoning that the parties were bound by any usage to which they have 
agreed, as well as by any practices they had established.166
In conducting its analysis, the court then considered Claudia’s 
invoices, Olivieri’s faxes, and third-party shipping documents, as well as 
the apparent practices of the parties, all as evidenced by the available 
record.167  In so doing, the court appears to have engaged in the kind of 
analysis required by the CISG under Articles 8 and 9. 
Interestingly, there is no reference in the court’s analysis to any 
potentially applicable usage.  Is this absence of any reference to usage due 
to the court’s assumption that the practices established by the parties would 
prevail over inconsistent usage?  Is it due to the absence of relevant usage in 
the applicable industry?  Is it simply due to failure by the parties to 
recognize the role that usage can play in determining party intent and 
establishing the terms of the parties’ contract, and thus, a failure to offer 
evidence of potentially applicable usages?  Because the court does not 
address the issue, it is difficult to conclude with certainty which of the 
foregoing is true. 
It seems unlikely that the court affirmatively concluded that the 
parties’ practices prevailed over inconsistent usage.  In fact, despite 
Claudia’s arguments regarding the parties’ practices, the court concluded 
that Claudia had “simply not submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
conclusively the parties’ prior practices. . . “168  Therefore, unless there is 
some other explanation, the parties may have missed an opportunity to 
construct a favorable argument based on usage. 
B.  Obligation to Pay Interest and the Applicable Interest Rate 
Similarly, in another early decision by a U.S. court applying Article 9 
of the CISG, one of the main issues before the court on post-trial motions 
for judgment as a matter of law and, alternatively, a new trial, was the rate 
of interest that had been awarded to the plaintiff, Zapata Hermanos 
Sucesores, S.A. (Zapata), a Mexican seller, by the jury.169  Although it 
ultimately reduced the damages awarded to Zapata by a small amount,170
the court essentially held for Zapata, finding adequate support for the jury’s 
165 Id. at *6. 
166 See id.
167 See Claudia, 1998 WL 164824 at *6–8. 
168 Id. at *8. 
169 See Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., Inc., No. 99 C 4040, 
2001 WL 877538, at *2–4 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2001). 
170 See id. at *2. 
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findings.171
The defendant, Hearthside Baking Co., Inc. doing business as Maurice 
Lenell Cooky Company (Lenell), argued that no interest whatsoever was 
payable because Lenell was never in arrears, an argument that Lenell 
constructed based on its course of conduct under the parties’ contract.172
Zapata countered Lenell’s argument by referring to express payment terms 
in the order documents, which seemed to contemplate the possibility that 
Lenell could be in payment default.173  The court concluded that the 
question of interest was ultimately a question for the jury, and the jury 
weighed the evidence and found in Zapata’s favor.174
In considering the role played by the jury, the court included by 
footnote the relevant jury instruction, which addressed damages recoverable 
by Zapata if the jury found a breach of contract by Lenell.175  The jury 
instruction addressed recovery of interest on any amounts past due, and it 
suggested that the jury was entitled to find, as a matter of fact, that the 
parties agreed—either expressly or even through a course of conduct—that 
no interest was recoverable.176  If the parties did not agree that no interest 
was recoverable, then the jury was instructed to determine the rate of 
interest, which would be the rate agreed upon by the parties, if any, or a 
reasonable rate if none was agreed upon by the parties.177
The jury was also instructed on finding the terms of any contracts that 
might have formed between Zapata and Lenell, including terms established 
by “the parties’ course of dealings [if the course of dealing became] part of 
the common understanding between the parties.”178
The overall emphasis on finding and deferring to the agreement of the 
parties is laudable.  But of course, the instruction should have referred not 
to course of dealing but instead to practices the parties established between 
themselves, and it should have included instructions allowing the jury to 
determine whether the parties were bound by any usage.179  Reference to 
Article 9 of the CISG or usage was also notably absent from the court’s 
analysis. 
Usage could have been helpful to one or the other of the parties here.  
Usage might have been relevant to show that interest either was or was not 
customarily paid in the applicable trade.  Usage might also have been 
relevant to show an appropriate default rate of interest or a method of 
171 See id. at *1. 
172 See id. at *3. 
173 See id.
174 See id.
175 See Zapata, 2001 WL 877538 at *3 n.6. 
176 See id.
177 See id.
178 Id.
179 See CISG, supra note 12, art. 9(1). 
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determining that rate. 
It is entirely possible that there was no identifiable rate of interest that 
either party could show would amount to such usage.  It is also possible that 
any such rate was lower than the rate desired by Zapata and higher than the 
rate Lenell was willing to accept.  It is also possible, however, that the 
parties failed to consider looking to potentially applicable usage to 
determine the applicable rate of interest.  Given the absence of any 
discussion of usage, the absence of careful analysis of Articles 8 and 9 of 
the CISG, and the court’s references to UCC terms, it seems likely that 
there was a simple failure to recognize that the analysis under the CISG is 
different from UCC analysis. 
More recently, in San Lucio, S.r.l. v. Import & Storage Services, LLC, 
there was a dispute between an Italian supplier and U.S. buyers of cheese, 
and the parties agreed that the dispute was governed by the CISG.180  The 
supplier, San Lucio, S.r.l. (San Lucio), brought a claim against the buyers 
for breach of the buyers’ payment obligations and filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment seeking an order that Italian, not U.S., law would 
govern determination of the applicable rate of prejudgment interest and 
recovery of attorneys’ fees.181 In considering San Lucio’s request for 
prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees pursuant to Italian law, the court 
noted that Article 78 of the CISG entitles a party to prejudgment interest 
when the other party fails to make or is late in making a payment that is 
due.182  The rate of interest, however, is not established by the CISG, and 
the court resorted to U.S. law to fix the rate.183  Similarly, the court noted 
that the CISG is silent on payment of attorneys’ fees.184  Even though 
Italian law provides for attorneys’ fees to be awarded to the prevailing 
party, the court noted that U.S. law does not.185 Consequently, attorneys’ 
fees were not recoverable because U.S. law was applied.186
The court in San Lucio, S.r.l. conducted a reasonably cogent analysis 
of the CISG, but it leapt too quickly to domestic law to determine whether 
attorneys’ fees were recoverable.  Moreover, there may have been another 
missed opportunity here to consider usage.  As with the Zapata Hermanos 
Sucesores, S.A. decision,187 the applicable rate of interest was in dispute, 
and usage might have been helpful in resolving that dispute.  It is also 
possible that there was applicable usage relating to the ability of a 
prevailing party to recover attorneys’ fees.  In either case, the parties might 
180 See San Lucio, S.r.l. v. Imp. & Storage Servs., LLC, Civil Action No. 07-3031 
(WJM), 2009 WL 1010981, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 20, 2009). 
181 See id.
182 See id. at *3. 
183 See id.
184 See id. at *1. 
185 See id. at *1, n.1. 
186 See San Lucio, 2009 WL 1010981 at *4. 
187 See Zapata, 2001 WL 877538, at *2–4. 
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have missed an opportunity to construct a favorable argument based on 
some potentially applicable usage. 
CONCLUSION 
If the contracting parties have taken the time and incurred the cost 
necessary to put in place a robust written agreement establishing the 
relevant agreed-upon terms of their arrangement, a party should be 
foreclosed from attempting to evade its unambiguous responsibilities under 
the agreement by incorporating a more favorable contract term based on 
otherwise applicable usage under Article 9 of the CISG.  The role of the 
court is to determine the parties’ intent—actual intent, when possible—and 
the written contract in that case very likely offers the best evidence 
available of the actual intent of the parties. 
But if, as is often the case in the fast-paced world of commercial 
transactions, the parties have not reduced their agreement to a writing, then 
each of the parties would be remiss not to consider potentially applicable 
usage as one important source for determining the binding terms of the 
contract of sale of goods between the parties. 
Whether there is an apparent written agreement or not, if either party 
seeks to introduce evidence of usage as a potential term of the parties’ 
agreement, then the court must consider whether the usage in question has 
become a term of the parties’ agreement.  The court must do this without 
giving automatic preference to any other source of contract terms, including 
any practices the parties seem to have established between themselves and 
any conduct of the parties. 
Naturally, the concerned commercial lawyer might chafe at the notion 
that an express agreement, mutually adopted by the parties, could somehow 
later be undermined by a creative (and perhaps spurious) argument based on 
some discovered usage that would call for an allocation of risk or 
responsibility that is different from that established by the written 
agreement.  To be clear, this Article does not advocate for using usage to 
undermine the bargain in fact that has been struck by the parties, nor does 
the CISG compel—or even permit—such a result.  Rather, the CISG 
contemplates determining the actual intent of the parties and deferring to 
their will.188  What better evidence of that actual intent is there than the 
parties’ own written agreement?  Ultimately, it is likely that a robust written 
agreement that has been affirmatively adopted by the parties is the very best 
evidence available for determining the parties’ actual intent to be bound.  
Similarly, the actual conduct of the parties could offer good evidence 
regarding their mutual understanding of their bargain. 
But the truth is that sometimes parties adopt writings that are 
inaccurate or incomplete.  At other times, one party will offer up a writing 
188 See CISG, supra note 12, arts. 6 & 8. 
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that it claims constitutes the agreement between the parties, but that writing 
might not reflect the parties’ actual bargain.  When that happens, the writing 
may not be good evidence of the parties’ actual intent at all.  Article 8 of the 
CISG recognizes this and instructs courts to consider all the circumstances, 
including usage, when determining what the parties intended.  This is true 
even when there is a writing and the writing seems at first blush to compel a 
certain outcome. 
Similarly, sometimes parties engage in conduct that is not required by 
their contract.  And that conduct might be inconsistent with an otherwise 
applicable usage.  The usage can be a binding term of the contract under 
Article 9 of the CISG nevertheless.  The mere fact that parties have engaged 
in certain conduct that appears to constitute an established practice should 
not foreclose the possibility of considering usage as the contract term that 
ought to prevail, to the extent such a priority was actually intended by the 
parties, which is a question of fact.  Deeming usage irrelevant when there 
appears to be party conduct that is inconsistent with the usage ignores that 
possibility and can lead to the actual intent of the parties being ignored.  
That result is not consistent with the CISG.  Courts surely should consider 
the contents of any relevant writing and any actual conduct of the parties.  
But “the investigation is not to be limited to those words or conduct even if 
they appear to give a clear answer to the question.”189
Unfortunately for decision makers, there is no bright-line rule that 
emerges when analyzing and applying Article 9 of the CISG.  However, 
there is an analytical framework courts can use by marching through the 
individual parts of Article 9 to determine the terms of the contract.  If any of 
the terms of the parties’ agreement conflict with each other, then it is up to 
the finder of fact to determine which contract term the parties intended to 
prevail, without assuming an automatic hierarchy. 
When there is a usage that is arguably relevant for supplying a term of 
the contract between the parties and there is also an apparent practice that 
the parties seem to have established between themselves, the practice, as 
something affirmatively undertaken by the parties, could reflect the parties’ 
actual intent regarding their mutual agreement to be bound.  But this will 
not be true in every instance, and the CISG does not compel—or even 
allow—the conclusion that the practice automatically prevails over the 
usage.  On the contrary, the CISG requires giving due consideration to the 
possibility that the parties intended the usage to prevail over the practice.  If 
that was the parties’ intent, then the court should defer to party intent and 
recognize the usage as an enforceable, binding term of the parties’ 
agreement that is not trumped by party practice.  By doing so, the ex ante
189 United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 
Austria, Mar. 10—Apr. 11, 1980, Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat, art. 7, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.97/5 (Mar. 14, 1979), reprinted in Official Records, supra note 142, at 18. 
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will of the parties is respected. 
But U.S. courts have largely failed to look carefully at the text of 
Article 9 and have not considered the possibility that usage could prevail 
over conduct or party practice.  Courts are obligated to consider that 
possibility, and it is important that they live up to that obligation for the 
sake of the rule of law and for promoting uniformity, predictability and 
certainty in international trade and commerce.  Until courts get this analysis 
consistently right, there will continue to be unnecessary and undesirable 
uncertainty regarding binding terms of contracts governed by the CISG. 
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